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Dialectical Materialism and Proletarian
Literature
BY LEONARD BROWN

Introduction: Remembering Leonard Brown
BY JOHN W. CROWLEY

LE 0 N A R D B ROW N , a legendary figure in his own time, was still
well remembered in 1970, a decade after his death, when I joined
the English Department at Syracuse. His former colleagues used to
talk about him, some with awe, and for a while there was a poetry
prize named in his honor. But times changed, senior faculty passed
on, memories dimmed, and funding for the prize dried up. For a
while, Brown faded from view.
He had enjoyed a long career at Syracuse. Born 31 January 1904,
in Belvidere, Nebraska, Leonard Stanley Brown graduated in 1924
from Cotner College and earned his M.A. a year later from the
University of Nebraska. Only twenty-one when he arrived at
Syracuse in the fall of 1925, Brown remained on the faculty for
nearly thirty-five years, rising to the rank of assistant professor in
1930 and, after a very long wait, to associate professor in 1955. He
died in his Euclid Avenue apartment on 5 January 1960, a month
shy ofhis fifty-sixth birthday.
Except for a year's graduate work at the University of Chicago,
Brown never pursued the doctoral degree that was to become
increasingly requisite to academic advancement. Nor did he publish
the scholarly articles and monographs expected of English profe.ssors at large research institutions. Although a handful of his poems,
stories, and critical essays did appear, mainly in the Sewanee Review,
Brown was best known in print for the trio of anthologies he
John W. Crowley is professor of English at Syracuse University, where he has
taught since 1970. He has also served as department chair. A specialist in American literature, Crowley recendy completed The White Logic: Alcoholism and Gender in American Modernist Fiction (1994).
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edited: Modern Short Stories (1929), A Quarto if Modern literature
(1936), and Literature for Our Time (1947). Like all such textbooks,
these counted for little as "scholarship" at the time, and they have
disappeared with the pedagogical moment that produced them.
Brown devoted his career to teaching, and his enduring reputation was that of an extraordinary teacher. I was reminded of his
impact in 1988, when one of his students, Arthur J. Carr, wrote to
the department about obtaining a copy of his master's thesis from
1937. It was of value to him, he explained, in part because Brown
had supervised it; and in recalling the Syracuse ofthe late 1930S, Carr
asserted that the "most remarkable member of the Department in
those years was, surely, Leonard Brown."
These sentiments were echoed a few years later, when another
ofBrown's students, Karl Korstad, sent me an essay he had written
about his experience as a graduate student instructor at Syracuse
from 1937 to 1942. Korstad also testified to Brown's catalytic effect
and charismatic force as a mentor and intellectual examplar:
Many of us attended his courses, sometimes more than
once, for they were different each year, reflecting the
thinking and evaluating he had done in the interim.... He
was the stimulant and the guide we needed.
Leonard, like many other American intellectuals and
writers in the thirties, had sought to explore the implications of the ideas of Freud, ofJung, ofDarwin, ofMarx, of
the "functionalist" anthropologists, and ofEinstein's theory
ofrelativity and Heisenberg's theory ofindeterminacy.
The importation of these ideas to the undergraduate classroom
was Brown's special project in those days. He instigated an innovative approach to Freshman English, one in which students were
challenged with supplemental readings from Berkeley, Darwin,
Marx, Freud, Einstein, and such anthropologists as Malinowski,
Boas, and Mead. Korstad remembered that some instructors, with
Brown's encouragement, went as far as to teach grammar along
functionalist lines: "We classified parts of speech not for what they
were, but for what they did."
This was in the fall of 1939, and the ferment continued for a

42

couple of years during which the freshman course was radically
overhauled. Then a reaction set in as the new-fangled ideas met resistance from inside and outside the department, and the curriculum
reverted to its former emphasis on grammar, rhetoric, and Western
world literature. Brown was deeply discouraged by these developments. "I doubt that much we are interested in will be at all possible in education henceforth," he gloomily wrote to Korstad, then
in the wartime Army Medical Corps. "We have reached the Imperial Days when the country will button rigidly down, and one of
the first things to be buttoned fast will be the educational system."
It was during the time when many American intellectuals were
marching to a Marxist drum that Brown wrote his lecture on "Dialectical Materialism and Proletarian Literature." The piece, which
dates most likely from 1 937 or 1 938, is reflective of the brief era of
good feelings that prevailed on the political left between 1 9 3 5 and
1939; that is, between the institution of the Popular Front, the
softer Communist Party line meant to support alliances among
anti-Fascists of all stripes, and the unexpected signing of the NaziSoviet Non-Aggression Pact, which sowed discord and prompted
an exodus from party ranks. Brown was never a member; and although he moved as far to the left as he ever would during the
1930S, he stayed fundamentally "liberal" in his suspicion of doctrinal rigidities (including those ofwhat he called "Pseudo-Marxists")
and his commitment to the free play of conflicting ideas.
Intended for a general audience and written with pristine clarity
and argumentative precision, "Dialectical Materialism and Proletarian Literature" addressed a topic once of great moment to those
seeking portents of revolution in American writing of the 1930S.
Brown alludes, for example, to Granville Hicks, whose Marxist literary history, The Great Tradition (1935), scanned the literary horizon for any sign of rising proletarian consciousness. Brown, in fact,
offers nothing in the way ofleftist literary cheerleading. He admires
Marx and Engels less as systematic thinkers than as exponents ofthe
same philosophical relativism that he was attempting to bring to the
freshman curriculum at Syracuse.
Published here for the first time, "Dialectical Materialism and
Proletarian Literature" is part of a larger collection of Leonard
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Brown's papers that will soon become available in the Syracuse
University Archives. These papers, which consist mainly ofsyllabi,
detailed course outlines, lecture notes, and other course-related
material, suggest his immense devotion to teaching. Teaching is an
evanescent art-a thing of words and silences, gestures and stillnesses that literally vanish (but not without a trace) into the thin air
that is their medium. The fullness of a great teacher's gift eludes
capture in even the best ofhis writings. Such an occasional piece as
"Dialectical Materialism and Proletarian Literature" certainly gives
some hint of Brown's powers of mind. But he attained his highest
voltage in class, and his true legacy was the inspiration he so freely
gave to his many devoted students.

Dialectical Materialism and Proletarian Literature

SINCE PROLETARIAN LITERATURE avows an alliance with dialectical materialism, we ought to understand the theory before
attempting to evaluate the claims ofthe literature. And we ought to
understand the theory at its source. Marx and Engels, that is, as the
major apologists of dialectical materialism, ought to be asked to
stand only upon what they said, rather than upon what their enthusiastic friends and enemies assert they said. Accordingly we take our
first step toward an understanding of dialectical materialism by removing two misunderstandings ofit that are popular or current.
Dialectical materialism is sometimes misconceived as only another
of the many varieties of nineteenth-century absolute determinism.
Now the postulate ofdeterminism is simply that everything is governed by law. So far so good. But now occurs the troublesome
question: If everything is governed by law, who or what is or are
the governor or governors, the governing cause or causes? Who or
what makes the law? Many answers have been made to this question.
But anyone answer will tend in one of two general directions: It
will tend to say either that man has a governing part in determining
how things shall go, or that he has not. The last answer, that man
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Leonard Brown (ca. 1937). (Courtesy ofJacqueline Brown.)

has nothing whatever to say about his destiny, is the essentially fatalistic answer of the absolute determinist. But this is no answer at
all. For the real question remains: If man is not, then what is the
determining cause or causes? Ultimately the absolute determinist
simply says, in effect, that nobody knows. That is why man is helpless, and his destiny determined.
During the nineteenth century, Marx's century, this essentially
fatalistic determinism had a great vogue, and followed two lines of
development. One was explicitly pessimistic. In the unprofessional
language ofthe average man it asserted that things were going from
bad to worse and nothing could be done about it. In the symbolic
language ofthe decadent poets it appeared as an imagery of tombs,
graves, gaols and seasons in hell. In the professional language of
philosophers ofhistory, e.g. Spengler, it declared that Western Civilization was moving toward annihilation, from which all man's
effort was powerless to withhold it. This was the pessimistic line of
development.
Now if one can turn this pessimistic determinism upside down,
decidingjust as fatalistically that things are getting better rather than
worse, one emerges as an optimistic determinist. This second attitude appeared among the world's citizenry several years ago in the
sweet guise of Coueism-"day by day in every way I am getting
better and better." It had emerged earlier in poetry, as in Browning's "God's in His Heaven; all's right with the world." Comte,
Herbert Spencer and even Darwin represent this position in the
realm of theory. And a good deal of our linear and evolutionary
writing of history has assumed this bent, the most ambitious of recent examples being perhaps Sorokin's three volume work entitled
Social and Cultural Dynamics, which concludes: "The oblique ray of
the sun still illumines the glory ofthe passing epoch.... Beyond it,
however, the dawn ofa new great ... culture is probably waiting to
greet the men ofthe future." This is the optimistic line ofdevelopment followed by absolute determinism during the last century.
Our purpose here is not especially to quarrel with either the pessimistic or optimistic view as described above, but only to notice
that both are merely varieties of absolute determinism, that both
are essentially fatalistic. Things have gradually through the cen-

turies got better or worse, or have failed to get better or worse, in
spite ofeverything that everybody did. Ifthings have got better it is
because ofGod, or some other extra-human cause; ifthey have got
worse, it is similarly because of the devil, or another agent of evil,
also extra-human. In either case we are confronted with absolute
determinism; our destiny is unalterable. We have got to go on getting
better or worse, suffering the whims of Thomas Hardy's President
of the Immortals or the beneficence ofTennyson's "one increasing
purpose," whether we like it or not.
N ow dialectical materialism, as we said at the beginning, is
sometimes misconceived as only the economic brand of this absolute determinism. But there are certain significant exceptions.
In the first place, Marx and Engels, as philosophers of history,
never said that things are getting better, or worse; they said only
that things are changing, have always changed, and will always
change. They believed it was futile to talk about some inhuman abstraction known as historical change, because there is no history
without people. Accordingly they preferred to discuss a particular
change, the French Revolution for example. For an analysis of a
particular change enabled one to decide whether it was good or
bad and for whom. Consequently they were never prophetically
cocksure of either a pessimistic or an optimistic future, as are respectively Spengler and Sorokin. They saw no good or bad bogey
swimming down the stream ofhistory.
In the second place, Marx and Engels contended that human
history is made, not by extra-human agents-mystical, supernatural
or otherwise-which are outside man's control, but by man himself
Man determines his own destiny.
In the third place, dialectical materialism was never claimed by
either Marx or Engels as a blanket theory of history, that is, as an
explanation of everything, past, present and future. This futile
claim is the rock which wrecks most systems ofabsolute determinism. For absolute determinism has to begin, unavoidably, with an
arbitrary assumption, a hypothesis-for example, that things are
getting better or worse with time, or that history moves in cycles.
Then, once this initial assumption is made, the absolute determinist
is inescapably and logically committed to an explanation of history
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in terms of the hypothesis; he has to write his history to fit, for if
something does not fit, the arbitrary hypothesis with which he began is obviously no good, and consequently neither is the architecture of history he has so laboriously erected upon the nonexistent
foundations of his arbitrary hypothesis. Of course things can be
warped to fit; the medieval Church's distortion of the classics is a
case in point. But this is dangerous business, for sooner or later
some enterprising soul discovers the trick, as the Revival of Learning discovered the real classics, and so demolishes the whole edifice.
The cyclical systems of absolute determinism, which contend that
all cultures pass through exactly the same stages and those stages in
the same order, are now being destroyed by the discovery of facts
that cannot be made to fit into the cyclical theory. 1
The distinction, then, between absolute determinism and dialectical materialism is that the latter does not begin with an arbitrary
hypothesis that commits it to a uniform explanation ofall details of
history; it does not fall, in short into the fatalistic trap. "This is what
has happened," says the absolute determinist; "hence, this is what
will happen." "Not so," replies Marx or Engels. "This is what has
happened, and this is what will happen if all conditions are right."
That little "if" makes all the difference. And dialectical materialism
insists that man controls the "if"
We have tried to correct the confusion of dialectical materialism
with absolute determinism. We shall now try briefly to correct its
confusion with mechanical materialism.
Materialism is as old as Democritus, who assured us that nothing
exists save the motion of atoms in an empty void; all else is delusion. The soul itself consists of fine smooth atoms, whose motion
produces the phenomena we call life. Epicurus took over this
atomic doctrine and added the denial that purposive acts from
without can ever interfere with the natural course ofatoms. Ethics

1. The Peruvians, for example, did not pass through the nomad and pastoral
stages for the simple reason that they had no cattle. Or again, matriarchal forms
of society have not always preceded patriarchal forms, as has been claimed by
certain absolute determinists, because they have not done so among the tribes of
British Columbia.

then became, as for some ofthe stoics, a problem really in physicsthe good life was the life perfectly attuned to the natural dance of
the atoms.
These old doctrines crop up again in the nineteenth century. By
the time we reach Haeckel, he is dismissing free-will, the dualistic
idea ofa personal God, and the soul as delusions, and is accounting
for all known phenomena-material, mental and spiritual (including consciousness)-by matter and force alone. Matter and force:
this is mechanical materialism. As in an earlier materialist, Lucretius,
the nature ofthings is what it is, and since man is part ofthe nature
of things, he is what he is. "Let him submit in silence, then, to nature's mandates, which nothing can alter." (Holbach.)
N ow Marx and Engels attacked this mechanical materialism because they believed that it begged, like absolute determinism, the
fundamental question: Why does human history change? Or to exemplify this question in particular terms: Why did the thirteenth
century, for instance, build gothic cathedrals, but the twentieth
skyscrapers?
To this kind of question the mechanical materialist could only
trot out his blanket answer: Matter and force. We readily grant,
replied the dialectical materialist, the existence of matter and force
in the thirteenth century, and their existence in the twentieth. But
this tells us nothing that we want to know. What made matter and
force so alter their modes of activity as to relinquish the human
habits of the thirteenth century for those of the twentieth? What
changes human habits? That is what we want to know. Pinned
down finally in this way, the mechanical materialist could only say
what the absolute determinist said: Nobody knows.
Marx and Engels' major effort, then, was to construct a philosophy which would answer the question that neither mechanical
materialism nor absolute determinism could answer. And despite
the formidable sound of the phrase "dialectical materialism," it
constitutes basically a very simple answer: Human history changes
because men change it. This is the first fundamental tenet ofMarxism.
We have now tried to correct two misconceptions of dialectical
materialism, namely, that it is on the one hand a variety ofabsolute
determinism or on the other of mechanical materialism. Accord49

ingly, with those two systems of thought identified and out of the
way, we turn to dialectical materialism itself
II

We begin with the fundamental tenet already mentioned: Human history changes because man changes it. Why does he change
it? Because certain needs, of which he becomes conscious from
time to time, create in him certain desires. He then acts to satisfy his
needs by fulfilling his desires. The result of his actions is historical
change. Marx then moves one step further to ask the all-important
question: What, what creates the human needs which lead to the
human desires which lead to the human actions which change history? The basis of the historical process, it will be seen, is the unknown which first creates the human needs.
Marx identified this unknown as the economic system of ownership, production and distribution of material goods which characterizes any given society. As Engels said: "Marx discovered the
simple fact that human beings must have food, drink, clothing and
shelter first of all, before they can interest themselves in politics,
science, art, religion and the like. This implies that the production
of the immediately requisite material means of subsistence, and
therewith the existing phase of development of a nation or an
epoch, constitutes the foundation upon which the state institutions, the legal outlooks, the artistic and even the religious ideas are
built up. It implies that these latter must be explained out of the
former, whereas the former have usually been explained as issuing
from the latter." From this material source, then, arise the human
needs. That is why Marx called his system dialectical materialism.
But just how does an economic system create human needs?
Here we must turn to an examination ofthe word "dialectical."
Originally, in Greece, dialectic simply meant the process of getting at the truth through a debate carried on by opposing sides.
One side concerned itself with the defense of a supposedly established thesis, and was known, I need not say, as the thesis side. The
other side did its best to destroy the supposedly established thesis,
and accordingly was known as the antithesis side. The two sides
then clashed or debated, and from the debate finally emerged a new
50

conception ofthe truth, which resembled wholly neither the thesis
nor the antithesis point of view, but rather a compromise, or, in
technical terminology, a synthesis of the thesis and antithesis. This
synthesis then obviously became a new and supposedly established
thesis, but it immediately provoked a new antithesis, which rose to
challenge it. A second debate occurred, from which emerged a still
newer compromise or synthesis. This then became, in its turn, still
another supposedly established thesis, provoked its own antithesis;
they clashed-and so ad infinitum. Thesis-antithesis-synthesis: thesisantithesis-synthesis:-to the end oftime. This process is dialectic.
The notion of dialectic passed naturally into philosophy, and in
the nineteenth century we find Marx borrowing it from Hegel and
giving it a peculiarly materialistic cast. Briefly, he believed that the
social process is like the logical process just described, that it is dialectical. And since he believed that the basis ofsociety, for reasons
already given, is economic or material, it followed that the economic
process is necessarily dialectical.
Society, always and at any given moment, then, operates dialectically, and the fundamental area of dialectical operation is the
economic or material sphere. One side of a given society, that is,
will be the thesis side, the group that owns the material means of
production-land, factories, or whatever it may be; this group will
be primarily concerned with its own preservation and the unhampered continuation of its characteristic economic activities. But its
very economic pursuits will unavoidably call into existence its antithesis, another group that has no material stake in the economic
organization, does not own the material means of production, but
is necessary, as workers or otherwise, to the continuance of the
established economy. As the thesis or established or owning side of
this society continues to expand and amplify its activities, it naturally increases the numbers and therefore the eventual strength of
the antithesis group, until finally this second group, strong enough
now to defy the first, emerges into the open, forcibly rebels, and
wins or loses a social revolution. This is the class struggle. But win
or lose, the new social order will wholly resemble neither of the
older two; instead it will be a synthesis or compromise of both.
This new social order now becomes the established one, the new

51

thesis, and will have its own peculiar economic organization. But
now its economic activities in turn provoke a new antithesis, a new
group of have-nots, who gradually grow in numbers, emerge into
the open, forcibly rebel, etc.
Applied to particular societies, the dialectic affords analyses
somewhat like the following (these are admittedly very sketchy,
and are meant to be only illustrative): Land was the fundamental
economic means of production in the Roman State. The Roman
patrician, in order to get more land, had to dispossess, by taxation
or otherwise, his weaker brother, the plebeian. The more land the
patrician appropriated in this way, the greater the number of those
he dispossessed. Soon there were a great many of these landless
men, the Christians and others. Being many, they dared to complain, and their numbers got them a hearing. Eventually the Roman
emperors were forced to recognize them and their Christianity as
the state religion. When Rome, as we say, "fell," these strongly
organized rebels, the Church, having no material stake in the old
society, naturally did not fall with it; they continued, struck up an
alliance with the Franks under Charlemagne, and became the new
thesis or established order, Christian feudalism.
Under Christian feudalism land was again the economic means
of production. Accordingly the old Roman story repeated itself
Land holdings gradually became centralized in the hands of the
dominant class, the Church and the feudal nobles. Dispossessed and
propertyless serfS and handicraftsmen, the have-nots, grew in numbers, and finally emerged openly as burghers and traders. Eventually they rebelled against the medieval Church in the Protestant
Reformation, and against the feudal nobles in the constitution of
the prince, the modern monarch obedient to the House ofCommons.
So capitalism, the new order, the new thesis, was born.
In this new capitalistic society money displaces land as the economic focus. But as capital develops itself in an effort to make
money, it has perforce to develop its antithesis, a body ofpropertyless men to do the work of capitalism, the proletariat or modern
working-class. Capitalism cannot get along without them. But this
proletariat can live only so long as it can find work, and it can find
work only so long as its labor increases capital, that is, makes profits.
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When capital, through failure of its markets to expand continuously, runs into depressions, shuts down its factories, refuses to
make goods (for the very good reason that nobody can buy them),
destroys food and plows under crops in the name of overproduction, and throws men out of work, who, be it remembered, can
live only so long as they do work, restlessness and rebellion, John L.
Lewis and the C.I.O. naturally occur. That is, the have-nots clearly
have no interest in maintaining an economic system that behaves in
the way just described, for it fails to provide them with the immediate material means ofsubsistence.
These are the workings ofthe dialectic in history.
III

And so we come to the immediate principles that lead directly to
the proletarian writer.
We have already heard dialectical materialism contending that
the economic or material is the true basis of social structures. We
now turn to a second contention, namely, that upon its economic
base any society will and does erect its ideological superstructures-laws, political forms, arts, religions, etc., in short, its schema
of ideas and relationships. We now turn to a third contention,
which is, that since the economic system does not exist in vacuo, but
rather in the hands of its owners, the dominant class, those owners
will naturally encourage that kind of superstructure or schema
which they favor or can afford to ignore, and will discourage,
forcibly if necessary, those which they do not agree with or find
dangerous to their self-preservation. That is, Socrates was put to
death by the state because he taught people how to call things into
question. The Middle Ages built cathedrals because the Church
dominated the society of the period. We build skyscrapers because
business needs them. Early capitalism discouraged the use ofRoman
numerals and encouraged Arabic because commercial accounting
found the latter more desirable. Don Quixote satirized chivalry because the growing middle-class society of his time made chivalry
anachronistic. Hitler discourages all older views of Shakespeare,
who now emerges in recent German scholarship as a true Aryan
mystic, none other. Pennsylvania bans fums ofthe Spanish War be53

cause Loyalist economics does not square with the economics of
United States Steel. In short, the ideas, habits, customs, arts, beliefs
and practices encouraged and countenanced in any society are
likely to be those favored by the established or owning class of that
society, and since that class is dominant only because it owns the
economic means of material production, Marx and Engels could
say that the ideological superstrucures are reared upon the foundations ofthe economic substructure.
N ow we add a corollary to this. Any economic system produces
its disaffected, its have-nots, who wish to become the haves. What
of them? They will have their ideologies too, superstructures
erected upon the economic foundations not of reality but of what
they hope will become reality, that is, the economic system they
want. Their ideas, schema and representations will reflect, Marx
contends, their economic desires. Fear of retaliation by the ruling
class may lead revolutionary writers to disguise their ideas, in the
innocent garments of allegory for example, but underneath the
symbolism the revolutionary point of view will persist. Usually
these ideologies of the have-nots are confused and chaotic, naive
and crude, to begin with, because underneath them is not yet any
real economic organization, only wishful thinking. They are likely,
therefore, not to seem to have any material roots, or as we say, to be
"grounded in reality," reality being for most of us, we should remember, what we already know. Thus the economic desires of the
rebellious will naturally tend to give to their ideological work definite characteristics. The owning or ruling class, against whom they
are rebelling, will tend to furnish them with villains, and their own
class with heroes. The class struggle itself will furnish them plots
and themes simply because that struggle seems the most important
thing in the world to them; upon its outcome hangs their destiny.
What could be more natural, therefore, than that they should portray it in their work?
IV

From the disaffected group in capitalistic society, consequently,
have come the ideologies of our proletarian writers, most of
whom, curiously, are of middle-class origins. To date only a very
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little of proletarian literature has been good; most of it is very bad.
In this it seems to equal bourgeois writing. But I believe it is possible to decide in a general way why some ofit is bad, what its vulgar
errors are. And since most of it relies, or thinks it relies, upon dialectical materialism for its analytical method, we are here forced to
return to Marx and Engels for a moment.
Earlier we said that neither Marx nor Engels urged dialectical
materialism as a blanket theory of history, that is, as an explanation
of everything past, present and future. They insisted, rather, that
history is full of accidents-fires, famines, plagues, floods, earthquakes, and especially that mysterious thing human personalitynone of which can be anticipated or is anticipatable by any theory
ofhistory. Accordingly nobody but an idiot will attempt to prophesy the future lock, stock and barrel. All dialectical materialism can
possibly do is to say that any given system of society will throw off
its discontents, that they will multiply and eventually rebel. And
here we come to the crucial point: Marxism does not say that revolutions are always won; they may be either won or lost, won as in
France and Russia, lost as in Germany to Hitler. Everything depends
on conditions at the time of rebellion, on leadership, material resources, strategy, etc. Now a number of earnest proletarian writers
have conveniently forgotten these express stipulations ofdialectical
materialism, which are merely scientific caution, and have blissfully
entered the old seventh heaven of the absolute determinists. They
seem to believe, in other words, that some good bogey inhabits the
present class struggle, that some beneficent Santa Claus will soon
drop the world they desire into their stockings without their lifting
a finger. Consequently they write what William Empson excellently calls, in his book Some Versions of Pastoral, the proletarian
pastoral,-idyllic pictures of a proletarian Eden, sprung like Minerva from the head ofJove. Evidently there has been more of this
writing done in England that in the United States. This kind of
thing is what I should call one of the vulgar errors of proletarian
writing. Certainly it is not based on either a true understanding of
present social conditions, which supposedly is its subject matter, or
on a true understanding of dialectical materialism, which supposedly is its method.
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Another mistake ofsome proletarian writers is their very evident
belief that all capitalists are villains and all workers heroes. Marx
and Engels expressly warned against this error. They have a number ofpassages on what they call the lumpen-proletariat, that is, the
scum, the dregs, the no-goods who inhabit the lower class as they
do any other. The simple device of saying that a man is heroic because he is of the lower class is therefore silly. Similarly it is just as
silly to say, as many proletarian writers do, that all characteristics of
the proletariat are heroic characteristics. You will find any number
ofproletarian writers making a great point ofthe rough, tough and
nasty worker, the hero who swears a blue streak, smashes all the
windows and knows all the girls. He is the contemporary equivalent of the cheap Italianate swashbuckler who took the fancy of
fifth-rate Renaissance writers, but whose pretensions were sharply
satirized by competent men like Shakespeare. Or again, the proletarian writer naively assumes that since the proletariat is rebelling
against capitalism, all capitalists are villains, have fat stomachs, with
dollar signs embroidered on their vests, and wear silk hats. And of
course all wives and daughters of capitalists are either soured on
life, or have no morals and live like the beasts ofthe fields. This easy
and false simplification of human nature is nothing new in literature; it appears whenever the writer relies on a hard and fast ethical
ideology, in other words, whenever ethical values seem to be sure
and unquestionable. Consequently this kind of simplification is
observable in medieval literature, in the chivalric romances and the
morality plays. In just this way the tenets ofcommunism are affording the proletarian writer certain hard and fast ethical values at the
present time, which enable him to simplify human nature. But this
is another vulgar error, even from the point of view of dialectical
materialism, as we shall see below.
Still another is the tendency of the proletarian writer to believe
that there is, always has been, and always will be only one reputable
subject matter for literary treatment, namely, the class struggle itself In other words, they believe that any work not immediately
and directly conditioned by the class struggle is therefore bad literature. Granville Hicks is not free from this error in his study of

American literature, The Great Tradition. But this is not Marxism:
Marx's own words tell us so: " ... certain periods of highest development of art stand in no direct connection with the general
development of society, nor with the material basis and skeleton
structure ofits organization."
The last vulgar error I shall mention is the contention of some
that you can't write good literature unless you are on the revolutionary side ofthe class struggle. This beliefis widely held; you will
even find it enunciated in the work of one ofthe very best Marxist
literary critics-Plekhanov. But do you not see that this is the old
fatalistic trap of the arbitrary hypothesis again? Once you assume
this, you must justify not only our contemporary proletarian writing, but also the literature ofall past history. Consequently Smirnov
and others have been doing their best to remodel Shakespeare,
Cervantes and other great writers in the revolutionary image oftheir
respective days, I need not say, with scant success. This futile practice
resembles nothing so much as it does Hitler's attempt to disparage
Goethe as a great writer because he wasn't an Aryan mystic.
N ow my point is that these vulgar errors are the errors of
pseudo-Marxists, people who either don't understand dialectical
materialism or willfully distort it. And this is unfortunate because
their silly practices come to stand with the rest of us as dialectical
materialism. That is why I said at the very beginning of this paper
that we ought to understand this theory at its source. It is always
well to remember that Marx openly avowed Aeschylus, Shakespeare and the legitimist Balzac as his favorite writers, rather than
the revolutionary literati who hung onto the skirts ofthe 1848 revolution; that Lenin heretically preferred the work of Pushkin to
that ofthe revolutionary poet Miakowski; that Stalin has told some
of his too-earnest communist authors that they can do worse than
give up their present revolutionary simplifications, and return to
Shakespeare in order to learn how to write. That is, men who really understand dialectical materialism never commit these vulgar
errors. All the true Marxist asks of any writer is that he be sincere,
that he describe what he knows, feels and sees. If he does this the
haves and have-nots, that is, the real texture ofthis writer's society,
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will explicitly or implicitly get into his work, as they got into
Chaucer's prologue, or Shelley's "Prometheus Unbound," or Gray's
"Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard."
In conclusion, I might add very briefly what I think is the major
reason for the various misunderstandings ofdialectical materialism.
And I can do this best by comparing it with one ofthe statistical sciences known as the theory of probability. This kind of statistician
deals with what he calls macro- rather than micro-magnitudes, that
is, masses of fact rather than an individual fact. A life-insurance
table is a good example. These tables tell us that approximately so
many men will die at the age of 30, so many at 40, so many at 50,
and so on; and to this end these tables are fairly accurate. But they
are absolutely valueless as prophecies of when anyone individual
man will die. That depends entirely on data not accessible to the
theorist ofprobability, for example accidents ofall kinds. As one of
these statisticians puts it: "For individuals there are no statistics.
And for statistics there are no individuals." Accordingly no one but
a fool would try to forecast any individual's destiny by means of a
life-insurance table.
N ow dialectical materialism, like these theories of probability,
deals only with macro- rather than micro-magnitudes, that is, the
great sweeping movements and mass changes in the social fabric.
Dialectical materialism may prophesy, with fair accuracy, the revolt
of the have-nots against the haves, but it cannot possibly prophesy
what John Doe or Richard Roe will do. Dialectical materialism
may indicate that because of class interests-family, education,
religion, property holding, upbringing, political affiliations, friendships, etc.-an individual will be more likely to stand on one side of
the class struggle than the other, just as life-insurance tables indicate
that any individual who lives to the age ofsix will probably live beyond ten; but this is tentative indication only, and not hard fact.
Pseudo-Marxists have tried to make it hard fact. This fundamental
confusion ofmass-action with individual-action is the chiefsource,
I believe, of most misunderstandings ofdialectical materialism.
As my only footnote of the evening, I urge anyone, finally, who
is interested either in dialectical materialism as a method of historical analysis, or in contemporary proletarian writing, to read Marx

and Engels and our contemporary writers, rather than listen to papers like this. For that man is doomed who listens only to others, as
Othello might tell you, ifhe were here.
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